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public utilities
Does the Mobile-Sierra Doctrine Apply When a Contract
Is Challenged By a Noncontracting Third Party?
CASE AT A GLANCE
The Federal Power Act requires that the rates for the transmission and sale of electricity in interstate
commerce be just and reasonable. Under the Mobile-Sierra doctrine, the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC) must presume that rates set in freely negotiated wholesale-energy contracts meet the
just and reasonable requirement. This presumption may be overcome only if the FERC concludes that the
contract seriously harms the public interest. The Court is now asked whether the doctrine is inapplicable
when a noncontracting third party challenges the rate.

NRG Power Marketing, LLC, et al. v. Maine Public Utilities Commission et al.
Docket No. 08-674
Argument Date: November 3, 2009
From: The Seventh Circuit
by Jay E. Grenig
Marquette University Law School

ISSUE
Is the Mobile-Sierra doctrine—which prohibits the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (FERC) from modifying or abrogating electricity and natural gas contracts unless they are shown to be contrary
to the public interest—inapplicable when a contract is challenged by
a non-contracting third party?

FACTS
In order to understand the lead-up to the current issues before the
Court, it is first necessary to learn a little bit about the electricity
industry. In this context, the term capacity refers to the ability to
produce electricity as opposed to electricity itself. Utilities purchase
capacity from generators to ensure that the system has adequate
electricity resources to meet demand at all times, averting blackouts
or other reliability problems. A utility that purchases capacity is essentially paying to ensure that electricity is available whether or not
that electricity is ultimately used.
In a capacity market—as opposed to a wholesale electricity market—
the transmission provider (the entity that is purchasing the capacity)
compensates the generator for the option of buying a specified quantity of power irrespective of whether it ultimately buys the electricity.
In order to maintain the reliability of the grid, transmission providers
generally purchase more capacity than is necessary to meet their
customers’ demand for electricity. This ensures that the transmission
providers are able to respond adequately to unexpected fluctuations in
demand.
New England’s electric utilities have long integrated their transmission systems so that capacity in one area can be used to meet demand
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elsewhere. In 1998, the utilities created an independent entity—ISO
New England—to manage those systems. An independent system operator is an independent company having operational control, but not
ownership, of the transmission facilities owned by member utilities.
For many years, New England’s capacity market has had numerous
problems. In 2003, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission noted
that the supply of capacity was barely sufficient to meet New England’s energy demand. The FERC, the generators, the transmission
providers, and the power customers have made several attempts to
address these issues. In 2003, a group of generators sought to enter
into “Reliability Must-Run” agreements with the ISO-New England.
Under a Must-Run agreement, a financially troubled generator in an
area with supply shortages may recover up to its full cost-of-service in
order to remain in operation.
The FERC accepted the Must-Run agreements filed by the New
England generators but only allowed those generators to recover
certain maintenance costs, not their full cost-of-service. In its orders
addressing the Must-Run agreements, the FERC simultaneously
directed the ISO-New England to develop a new market mechanism
that would include a location requirement. Such a requirement
separately sets prices for various geographical subregions. Thus,
prices would be highest in the regions with the most severe capacity
shortages, which would encourage additional generators to enter the
region and compete for business.
In response to the FERC’s directive, the ISO-New England proposed
a “locational capacity” market structure in March 2004 that included
four subregions, each of which would have a monthly auction for
capacity. The auctions would be based on an administratively deterPREVIEW of United States Supreme Court Cases

mined demand curve that would establish the price and quantity of
capacity that must be procured within each subregion. The FERC
commended the ISO-New England for adopting a locational pricing
mechanism that took account of transmission constraints between
different subregions within New England. Because the demand
curve proposed by the ISO-New England was extremely controversial,
numerous parties submitted comments and testimony regarding the
proper height and slope of the curve. The FERC set the matter for
hearing before an administrative law judge.
In June 2005, the administrative law judge issued a 177-page order
largely accepting the ISO-New England’s proposed demand curve.
Several parties filed exceptions to this decision, arguing that the
administrative law judge had wrongfully excluded evidence and had
failed to respond to comments about flaws in the ISO-New England’s
demand curve. On September 20, 2005, the full FERC heard argument
and subsequently established settlement procedures.
After four months of negotiations involving 115 parties, a settlement
was reached. Only eight of these parties opposed the final settlement. The key feature of the settlement agreement was the Forward
Capacity Market, which would replace the ISO-New England’s earlier
proposal and eliminate the need for the controversial demand curve.
Under the Forward Market, there would be annual auctions for capacity held three years in advance of when the capacity would be needed.
Each transmission provider would be required to purchase enough
capacity to satisfy its installed capacity requirement, which is the
minimum level of capacity necessary to maintain reliability on the
grid. The Forward Market also included a locational component.
The most contentious issue regarding the Forward Market was the
payments required from December 1, 2006, until June 1, 2010. The
three-year lead time left a three-year gap between the first auction
and the time when the capacity procured in that auction would be provided. The parties addressed this issue by negotiating a series of fixed
payments to be paid to generators during the transition period. The
agreement also provided that challenges to the transition payments
and the final Forward Market auction clearing prices—regardless of
whether the challenge is brought by a settling party, a nonsettling
party, or the FERC—would be adjudicated under the highly deferential public interest standard rather than the usual just and reasonable
standard.
On June 16, 2006, the FERC approved the settlement agreement, finding that, as a package, it presented a just and reasonable outcome for
this proceeding consistent with the public interest.
The Maine Public Utilities Commission and the Attorneys General of
Connecticut and Massachusetts sought review in the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia, arguing that the FERC’s approval
of the settlement was arbitrary and capricious, contrary to law, and
beyond the scope of FERC’s jurisdiction. Among other things they
asserted that the FERC unlawfully accepted a Mobile-Sierra provision
that imposed the deferential public interest standard of review on rate
challenges brought by nonsettling parties.
The court of appeals agreed, reasoning that the Mobile-Sierra doctrine
applies a deferential standard of review to preserve the terms of the
bargain agreed to by contracting parties. When a rate challenge is
brought by a noncontracting third party, the court held the MobilePREVIEW of United States Supreme Court Cases

Sierra doctrine does not apply; the proper standard of review remains
the just-and-reasonable standard in section 206 of the Federal Power
Act. Maine Public Utilities Com’n v. F.E.R.C., 520 F.3d 464 (D.C. Cir.
2008).
NRG Power Marketing, LLC, and other energy companies that have
settled with the FERC petitioned the Supreme Court for review.

CASE ANALYSIS
The Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 791a et seq., grants the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission exclusive jurisdiction over the
transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce and the sale
of electric energy at wholesale in interstate commerce by public
utilities. Under the Act, proposed rates for the sale or transmission of
power within FERC’s jurisdiction must be just and reasonable and not
unduly discriminatory or preferential.
The Federal Power Act provides that, when a party challenges a rate
or charge, the FERC must adjudicate the challenge under the justand-reasonable standard. The Mobile-Sierra doctrine carves out an
exception to this rule. The Mobile-Sierra doctrine originated in the
Supreme Court’s twin decisions in United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile
Gas Service Corp., 350 U.S. 332 (1956), and FPC v. Sierra Pacific
Power Co., 350 U.S. 348 (1956).
The Mobile-Sierra doctrine provides that when two or more parties
reach a negotiated settlement over a disputed rate, the FERC applies
a strong presumption that the settled rate is just and reasonable, and
the FERC may only set aside the contract for the most compelling
reasons. The purpose of the Mobile-Sierra doctrine is to preserve the
benefits of the parties’ bargain as reflected in the contract, assuming
that there was no reason to question what transpired at the contract
formation stage.
Under the Mobile-Sierra doctrine, the FERC may abrogate or modify
freely negotiated private contracts that set firm rates or establish a
specific methodology for setting the rates for service only if required
by the public interest. This doctrine recognizes the superior efficiency
of private bargaining, and its purpose is to subordinate the statutory
filing mechanism to the broad and familiar dictates of contract law.
Thus, when the parties to a rate dispute reach a contractual settlement, the FERC must enforce the terms unless the public interest
requires otherwise—that is, unless the negotiated rates might impair
the financial ability of the public utility to continue its service, might
cast upon other customers an excessive burden, or might be unduly
discriminatory. In this case, the Supreme Court is presented with
a question of first impression: may the FERC approve a settlement
agreement that applies the highly deferential public interest standard
to rate challenges brought by noncontracting third parties?
Petitioners argue that the court of appeals’ rationale conflicts with
the Supreme Court’s decision in Morgan Stanley. In Morgan Stanley
Capital Group Inc. v. Public Utility District No. 1 of Snohomish County, 128 S. Ct. 2733 (2008), the Supreme Court held that the FERC can
abrogate contract rates only in “extraordinary circumstances where
the public will be severely harmed.” The court of appeals reasoned
that applying the public-interest standard to nonparties would deprive
them of their statutory right to review under the just-and-reasonable
standard. Nevertheless, petitioners contend that Morgan Stanley
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explains that Mobile-Sierra’s public-interest standard is merely one
application of that just-and-reasonable standard—the one that governs contract rates.
According to petitioners, the public-interest standard is a restriction
on the FERC’s authority to abrogate contracts, not private parties’ authority to challenge them. They contend the public-interest standard
applies whether the FERC’s investigation is initiated in response to a
contracting party’s complaint, in response to a noncontracting party’s
complaint, or by the FERC acting sua sponte. Petitioners assert the
public-interest standard was developed for the precise purpose of
protecting the interests of noncontracting members of the public.
Petitioners argue that the Supreme Court premised the Mobile-Sierra
doctrine on the sensible notion that rates negotiated by sophisticated
buyers and sellers can be expected to be reasonable. According to
petitioners, the expectation of reasonableness cannot logically vary
with the identity of the person who challenges the rate. They say that
contract rates agreed to in a competitive wholesale market can be
expected to benefit consumers and other noncontracting parties, not
just the contracting parties themselves.
It is the petitioners’ position that the court of appeals’ decision
prevents Mobile-Sierra from providing any semblance of the contract
stability the doctrine is supposed to provide—stability essential to
critical infrastructure development. According to petitioners, a presumption protecting contract rates from just a few persons (contracting counterparties) while allowing everyone else to challenge them
free of Mobile-Sierra’s restrictions provides no stability at all.
Petitioners assert that the court of appeals’ decision rests on a
misunderstanding of contract principles. They explain that applying
Mobile-Sierra to a nonparty’s challenge does not bind the nonparty to
the contract. They say the existence of the contract is simply a fact
that makes the rate more likely to be reasonable.
The FERC filed a brief arguing that it acted reasonably and within its
statutory authority in approving, as just and reasonable, a comprehensive settlement. The FERC points out that the settlement contained a
provision stating that future challenges to certain rates established
under the settlement would be governed by the public interest MobileSierra standard of review. According to the FERC, the court of appeals
erred in setting aside the FERC’s exercise of discretion in approving
this aspect of the settlement, as a result of two fundamental misunderstandings of the Mobile-Sierra standard.
First, the FERC claims the court of appeals erroneously believed
the public-interest standard of Mobile-Sierra is applicable only to
challenges to contract rates brought by contracting parties. Because
it is the rate itself that is presumed just and reasonable, the FERC
declares the presumption should apply irrespective of the identity of
the party challenging the rate.
It is the FERC’s position that Morgan Stanley made clear that the
Mobile-Sierra public-interest standard is not an exception to the
statutory just-and-reasonable standard; it is an application of that
standard in the context of rates set by contract. The FERC says it is
the just-and-reasonable standard to involve an inquiry into the public
interest in the context of future challenges to rates set under this
settlement agreement.
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The FERC stresses that the Supreme Court has repeatedly held
that the Federal Power Act’s just-and-reasonable standard leaves
the FERC with considerable discretion in setting rates. The FERC
says it properly exercised that discretion in determining that the
public-interest standard should be applied here. Although the rates
covered by the settlement’s public-interest review provision are not
themselves contract rates to which the FERC was required to apply
Mobile-Sierra, the FERC claims it carefully reviewed the settlement.
As part of the review, the FERC claims it reasonably determined that
the transition payments fell within a zone of reasonableness, that the
auction process would produce just and reasonable rates, and that the
interest in rate stability made the application of the public-interest
test appropriate.
The respondents (including the Maine Public Utilities Commission
and the attorneys general of Connecticut and Massachusetts) were
parties to the contested FERC proceeding but object to the settlement
agreement agreed to by other parties and approved by the FERC. They
acknowledge that under the Mobile-Sierra doctrine, freely negotiated contracts by sophisticated buyers and sellers are presumed just
and reasonable as between the two of them. When a party to such a
contract challenges it, they say that the FERC may only provide relief
if the party shows that the public interest, strictly defined, will be
injured by the contract. In this case, however, the petitioners seek
to use that public-interest standard to limit the respondents’ ability
to challenge rates imposed under a settlement that the petitioners
adopted, but to which the respondents objected. According to respondents, applying the Mobile-Sierra doctrine in that manner would
unmoor it from its foundations, converting it to a sword by which
contracting parties can bind third parties to rates to which they
never agreed.
Respondents assert the rates produced by the settlement are not
“contract rates” to which the Mobile-Sierra presumption could apply
in the first place. They claim the rates at issue in this proceeding are
fundamentally different from the typical bilateral contracts that were
at issue in Mobile, Sierra, and Morgan Stanley. They say the transition
payments and the auction results are tariff rates of general applicability throughout New England. Respondents argue the Mobile-Sierra
public-interest standard applies only to rates arising from freely negotiated private contracts, and not to tariff rates or to rates established
as a result of a regulatory process.
Even assuming the Mobile-Sierra doctrine could apply to general
tariffs, respondents contend its presumption of reasonableness does
not apply to challenges brought by entities that objected to the settlement that produced the rates. Respondents explain the premise of the
doctrine is that the sophisticated parties that enter wholesale energy
contracts should be bound by their bargain, for they can be expected
to negotiate a just-and-reasonable rate as between the two of them.
Accordingly, respondents assert the doctrine restricts the ability of
a contracting party to obtain regulatory relief from the obligations
it voluntarily incurred. However, they argue the doctrine has no application to efforts by contracting parties to bind third parties to the
contractual terms. While the Federal Power Act properly holds a contracting party to an improvident bargain, respondents say the statute
cannot reasonably be construed as binding a nonsettling party to an
improvident bargain to which it objected. They assert the nonsettling
party is entitled to have the FERC review the rates under the ordinary
just-and-reasonable standard.
PREVIEW of United States Supreme Court Cases

Responding to the argument that allowing nonparties to challenge
contractual rates under the ordinary standard would eviscerate the
Mobile-Sierra doctrine because “hordes” of consumers indirectly affected by the rates would be able to file challenges, respondents point
out that they are not “indirectly affected” parties. To the contrary,
they say, the settlement created a tariff mechanism setting the terms
and conditions of service for all market participants in New England,
including respondents. Respondents argue that the Mobile-Sierra
doctrine does not permit settling parties to contractually bind nonsettling third parties to limit their challenges to a tariff derived from the
settlement rate mechanism simply because the parties have agreed
among themselves that such challenges should be limited.
Because the Mobile-Sierra doctrine does not apply to challenges by
respondents to rates produced by the settlement, respondents say the
court of appeals’ judgment should be affirmed. Although FERC argues
it has the authority to impose a Mobile-Sierra public-interest presumption in the absence of any contract from which such presumption might arise, respondents state that the FERC did not expressly
raise this argument in lower courts and did not assert it in its brief in
opposition. Respondents state the Supreme Court should therefore affirm the Court of Appeals’ judgment without reaching this argument.
According to respondents, the FERC is also wrong when the FERC
contends it has the discretion to apply a public-interest standard to
challenges by respondents under its broad authority to approve
contested settlement agreements it believes will produce just-andreasonable rates. However, respondents claim neither the Federal
Power Act nor any court precedent supports the proposition that
the FERC may simply rewrite the terms of the Federal Power Authority
based upon what the FERC believes may produce just-and-reasonable
rates. While the FERC has the authority to establish or approve a
mechanism to set capacity costs, respondents argue it does not have
the discretion to abrogate the respondents’ statutory rights under the
Federal Power Act. Respondents state the FERC is not permitted to
use its discretion to determine that the public-interest standard may
be applied outside a contract context.
Respondents argue petitioners also err in asserting that affirmance
would threaten industry stability. Respondents stress that the narrow
issue before the Supreme Court is whether an entity that objected
to a settlement can challenge rates that are produced by the settlement and imposed on them under the ordinary just-and-reasonable
standard. According to respondents, a positive answer to the question
will not undermine the Mobile-Sierra doctrine and the stability the
doctrine advances. Respondents assert that, generally, parties that
enter contracts understand that they generally cannot bind third parties to the contractual terms. They point out the FERC has applied
the Mobile-Sierra public-interest standard to nonparties only since
2002, yet there is no evidence that industry stability was threatened
before then.

SIGNIFICANCE
Petitioners assert that affirmance of the court of appeals’ decision
would threaten industry stability. They suggest that without a
guarantee that contract rates will almost never be modified,
producers and utilities will not invest sufficiently in the nation’s
energy infrastructure.
On the other hand, respondents say that the Federal Power Act gives
substantial protection against unwarranted modification of existing
contracts. They suggest that applying Mobile-Sierra’s public-interest
standard would make it significantly harder for dissenting energy
companies to challenge the rates that are imposed on them and then
passed on to consumers in the form of higher prices.
Jay E. Grenig is a professor of law at Marquette University Law School
in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. Professor Grenig is the author of Alternative Dispute Resolution published by Thomson Reuters/West. He is a
member of the National Academy of Arbitrators. He can be reached at
igrenig@earthlink.net or 414.288.5377.
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